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CASE NOTE

Treaty Termination and the Separation of
Powers: The Constitutional Controversy
Continues in Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S. Ct.
533 (1979) (Mem.)
DAVID
I.

A.

GOTrENBORG*

INTRODUCTION

Although the United States Constitution expressly provides how the
President may make treaties,1 it is completely silent as to the process by
which treaties should be terminated. In Goldwater v. Carter,2 a number
of members of Congress sought to have the constitutional question regarding the proper procedures required for the termination of treaties judicially resolved.3 The suit was filed in response to President Carter's announcement 4 that he was terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954
with the Republic of China.' Therefore, while the narrower issue was
whether the President could unilaterally terminate the Mutual Defense
Treaty without first consulting the Congress, the entire separation of
powers question as to the extent of permissible congressional involvement
in treaty terminations was opened for judicial review.
* B.A., 1977, The Colorado College; J.D. candidate, 1981, University of Denver.
1. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2 provides in relevant part: "He [the President] shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of
the Senators present concur. .. "
2. 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979) (Mem.).
3. Plaintiffs in the Goldwater suit were Senators Barry Goldwater (R., Arizona), Strom
Thurmond (R., South Carolina), Jake Garn (R., Utah), Orrin Hatch (R., Utah), Jesse Helms
(R., North Carolina), Gordon Humphrey (R., New Hampshire), Paul Laxalt (R., Nevada),
and James McClure (R., Idaho), and Representatives Robert Bauman (R., Maryland),
Steven Symms (R., Idaho), Larry McDonald (D., Georgia), Robert Daniel, Jr. (R., Virginia),
Bob Stump (D., Arizona), Eldon Rudd (R., Arizona), John Ashbrook (R., Ohio), George
Hansen (R., Idaho), John Rousselot (R., California), Robert Dornan (R., California), Don
Young (R., Alaska), Newt Gingrich (R., Georgia), James Collins (R., Texas), Mickey Edwards (R., Oklahoma), Dan Quayle (R., Indiana), Clair Burgener (R., California), and Ken
Kramer (R., Colorado). Carl Curtis (R., Nebraska), also a plaintiff, was a member of the
Senate in 1954 and participated in the ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty, note 5
infra.
4. 14 WEEKLY Cop. op PREs. Doc. 2266 (Dec. 15, 1978).
5. Mutual Defense Treaty, Dec. 2, 1954, United States-Republic of China, 6 U.S.T. 433,
T.I.A.S. No. 3178.
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The District Court for the District of Columbia decided the broad
constitutional question in favor of the plaintiffs and held that the approval of either a two-thirds senatorial majority or a simple majority of
both Houses of Congress was required before a President could terminate
any international treaty. 6 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia based its decision to reverse on the narrower issue of
whether the President could terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty of
1954.' In holding that the President was not required to seek congressional approval for such termination, the Court of Appeals strictly limited
its decision to the unique circumstances of the case at bar.8 On petition
for writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, in a memorandum decision, granted certiorari, vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the District Court with directions to dismiss the complaint.'
While the statement filed by Justice Rehnquist, to which a plurality
of the Court ascribed, 10 specified that the judgment of the Court of Appeals was vacated in order that it would not "spawn any legal conse' an analysis of the statements
quences,"11
filed with the Supreme Court's
memorandum decision and of the decision of the Court of Appeals is
helpful in determining whether other current treaties"2 may be terminated in a like manner and what steps, if any, Congress can take to assure
itself of a role in future treaty termination processes.
II. BACKGROUND

A.

Constitutional Authority
The President's treaty making powers are expressly enumerated in
the U.S. Constitution, which requires the executive to seek "the Advice
and Consent of the Senate . . ." before a treaty can be ratified by the

President. 18 The Constitution offers no guidance, however, on the question of whether any similar procedure is required for treaty terminations.
It was this issue which the plaintiffs sought to present to the United
States Supreme Court in Goldwater v. Carter.
B. Inherent Executive Authority
Above and beyond the relatively few specified constitutional powers
of the executive 1 ' lies the power which is universally recognized as inher6. Goldwater v. Carter, No. 78-2412 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 1979), reprinted in 125 CONG. Rac.
S14787-93 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
7. Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
8. Id., slip op. at 25.
9. Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979) (Mem.).
10. Id. at 536.
11. Id. at 538.
12. The North Atlantic Treaty, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Outer Space Treaty,
among others, contain termination provisions similar to those contained in the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. See note 128 infra.
13. Art. H, § 2, cl. 2; see note 1 supra.
14. The powers of the executive, set forth in Art. II of the Constitution, are broad and
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ent in a sovereign head of state. International law provides that a head of
state may, in determining the conduct of the state, effectively terminate
treaties or portions thereof. 5 This sometimes occurs when the executive
responds to a breach by the other party to a treaty and declines to be
further bound by the treaty e or when the circumstances have changed so
as to make abiding by the treaty no longer feasible.17 These powers are
incidents of what has been termed the "foreign affairs power'" of the
President.'9
C.

Treaty Termination Historically

The first treaty terminated by the United States was abrogated by an
Act of Congress. By this act, Congress declared the United States to be
no longer bound by the Treaties of 1778 with France.20

general in comparison with the direct and specific powers of Congress set forth in Art. I.
"The executive Power shall be vested in a President .... " U.S. Const. art. II, § 1. Unlike
the defined powers granted to Congress, the "executive Power" vested in the President is
significantly left undefined.
15. See, e.g., 5 J. MooRE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 319-87 (1906); 2 C. HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1516-58 (2d ed. 1945); 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
297-390 (1943).
16. Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 473 (1913).
17. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus.
18. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
19. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus played a large, albeit implicit, role in the decision of the Court of Appeals. See Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246, slip op. at 27-28 (D.C.
Cir. Nov. 30, 1979). This was despite the settled rule that the party causing the circumstances to change may not make use of such as grounds for terminating the treaty. See
generally 5 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 349-59 (1943).
20. Act of July 7, 1798, 1 Stat. 578. The Act provided:

Chap. LXVII-An Act to declare the treaties heretofore concluded with
France, no longer obligatory on the United States.
WHEREAS the treaties concluded between the United States and France
have been repeatedly violated on the part of the French government; and the
just claims of the United States for reparation of the injuries so committed
have been refused, and their attempts to negotiate an amicable adjustment of
all complaints between the two nations, have been repelled with indignity: And
whereas, under authority of the French government, there is yet pursued
against the United States, a system of predatory violence, infracting the said
treaties, and hostile to the rights of a free and independent nation:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States are of right
freed and exonerated from the stipulations of the treaties, and of the consular
convention, heretofore concluded between the United States and France; and
that the same shall not henceforth be regarded as legally obligatory on the
government or citizens of the United States.
APPROVED, July 7, 1798.
Chief Justice Marshall once stated that a "principle introduced at a very early period in our
history [and] deliberately established by legislative acts ... ought not to be lightly disregarded." McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400 (1819). The Supreme Court
has also recognized that when acts are "passed shortly after the organization of the government under the Constitution [when] [almong the members of that Congress were many who
had participated in the convention which formed the Constitution . . . the act has always
been considered, in relation to that instrument, as a contemporaneous exposition of the
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Fifty-four treaties have subsequently been terminated by a variety of
means: (1) by the President acting upon his own initiative and volition;
(2) by the President acting with senatorial consent; (3) by the President
acting pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress or other expression of
congressional concurrence; and (4) by the President acting pursuant to
specific legislation directing such a termination.' Although the number of
treaties terminated by the sole action of the President is subject to dispute," it is nevertheless clear that none were as significant as the Mutual
Defense Treaty of 1954."3 It is also beyond dispute that the vast majority
of treaty terminations took place with some form of congressional concurrence. Perhaps the single most important fact to be derived from the tangled history of treaty terminations is that the diversity of such historical
precedents leaves an inconclusive basis on which to decide the issue of
what actions, if any, Congress or the President must take in order to terminate a treaty.
D.

Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954

Following the Chinese Revolution and the Korean War, a mutual defense treaty was made between the United States and the Republic of
China (ROC or Taiwan) primarily to protect the ROC against the perceived threat of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Treaty was
signed by representatives of both nations on December 2, 1954.1' The
Senate advised ratification of the Treaty on February 9, 1955, without
taking any action by condition, amendment, or reservation to reserve for
itself a role in the termination provision of the Treaty.2 Article X of the
Treaty, which the Senate approved unamended, provided that although

highest authority." Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 300-01 (1930). In 1798, when the
first treaty termination occurred by legislation, John Adams, President at that time, had
been a delegate to the Constitutional Convention. Four members of Congress had signed the
Constitution and other members had undoubtedly participated in the various State ratifying conventions. Joirr CoMmrrrm ON PRINTING, UNrrEn STATES CONGRESS, BIOGRAPHICAL
DIRECTORY OF THE AmslUcAN CONGRESS 1774-1927 at 60, 1202 (Senator Langdon); 62, 1413,
1414 (Senator Pinckney); 60, 664 (Representative Baldwin); 61, 891 (Representative Dayton) (1928).
21. See generally Resolution Concerning Mutual Defense Treaties: Hearings on S.
Res. 15 Before the Sen. Comm. on ForeignRelations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1979) ("History of Treaty Terminations by the United States," an appendix to a memorandum prepared by the Department of State Legal Adviser); Scheffer, The Law of Treaty Termination
as Applied to United States De-Recognition of the Republic of China, 19 HARv. INT'L L.J.
931, 979-85, 993-95 (1978).
22. The defendants claimed that 13 treaties had been so terminated. See Brief for Appellant at 54-55, Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979). Judge MacKinnon, in his dissent, argued that only two treaties had been terminated in such a manner. See
Dissenting Opinion at 25-42, Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
23. The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 had symbolized the United States' commitment to deter communist expansionism in the years following the Korean War and its termination marked the first time that the United States had terminated a major military
alliance with a friendly, fiercely anti-communist government.
24. 6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178.
25. 101 CONG. Rzc. 1379-1416 (1955).
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the Treaty would otherwise remain in force "indefinitely," "[e]ither Party

may terminate
it one year after notice has been given to the other
26
Party.

The Treaty was subsequently ratified and proclaimed by President
Eisenhower on April 1, 1955.'1 The main thrust of the Treaty was found
in Article V which provided that, in the event of an attack on Taiwan, the
Pescadores, or United States Territories in the western Pacific, each
party "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.""

A decade and a half later, the United States sought to establish
closer ties with the PRC. An ultimate goal of full "normalization of rela-

tions between the PRC and the United States" was announced in the
"Shanghai Communiqu6" released simultaneously by both countries upon

President Nixon's visit to the PRC in February of 1972.20 The PRC conditioned such normalization of relations on the United States' derecognition of the ROC, a total military withdrawal from Taiwan, and a termina0
tion of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC.3

26. 6 U.S.T. at 437.
27. Id. at 433.
28. Id. at 436.
29. 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 435 (1972); 8 WEEKLY Comp. oF PREs. Doc. 473-76 (Feb. 28,
1972).
30. It became obvious shortly thereafter that the United States and the PRC held
somewhat divergent views as to what the goal of "normalization" encompassed. The PRC
considered normalization to be the establishment of de jure diplomatic relations. The
United States' interpretation of the term varied depending upon the political philosophies
of the administration currently in office. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated on behalf
of President Nixon that the United States had every intention of adhering to its defense
commitments in the Western Pacific Area and of maintaining its traditionally close diplomatic ties with Taiwan. 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 330, 428 (1972). Dr. Kissinger's position appears to have been taken in an attempt to achieve a mutually acceptable compromise with
the PRC and in an effort to demonstrate that the United States' view of normalization took
the form of a long negotiated process. Cf. 74 DEP'T STATE BULL. 486 (1976) (Dr. Kissinger's
announcement that "President Ford is committed to continue the process of normalization
...in accordance with the principles of the Shanghai Communique") (emphasis added).
The United States moved still closer to the PRC's view of normalization in the latter part of
the Ford Administration but continued to withstand the PRC's efforts to impose all of the
"Shanghai" preconditions. Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, described the goal of "normalization" as the "establishment of full diplomatic relations on a de jure basis with the People's Republic of China." United StatesChina Relations: The Process of Normalization of Relations: Hearings Before the Special
Subcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm. on InternationalRelations, 94th Cong.,
1st & 2d Seas. 120 (1975-1976).
The Carter Administration, however, abandoned the groundwork laid by previous administrations which had attempted to achieve "normalization" while retaining the nation's
historically close ties and defense commitments with the ROC. President Carter readily accepted all three of the previously unacceptable preconditions set forth by the PRC in the
"Shanghai Communique," thereby precipitating this very controversy over the extent of
Congress' role, if any, in such matters of foreign affairs.
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On December 15, 1978, while Congress was not in session,8 1 President
Carter announced that, effective January 1, 1979, the United States
would formally recognize the PRC as the legitimate government of China
and would simultaneously withdraw recognition of the ROC.5 ' In addition, the President announced that "in accordance with the provisions of
the [Mutual Defense] Treaty," the ROC would be notified of the United
States' intent to terminate the Treaty. 8 On December 23, 1978, the State
Department formally notified the ROC that the Treaty would terminate
on January 1, 1980.
III. THE GOLDWATER DECISIONS
A. The District Court Opinion
One week after the President's announcement on December 15, 1978,
the plaintiffs filed suit in the Federal District Court for the District of
Columbia alleging that the President had violated his sworn duty to uphold the laws, including the treaties, of the United States. The plaintiffs
claimed that the executive had no unilateral authority under the Constitution to terminate treaties, and that the United States Government, not
the President, was the party invested by Article X of the Mutual Defense
Treaty with the power of termination."
By Memorandum-Order dated June 6, 1979, the District Court dismissed the complaint, without prejudice, on the ground that the plaintiffs
had not suffered the injury in fact needed to gain standing." The court
noted that resolutions then pending in the Senate might settle the dispute, without necessitating judicial intervention.86 The court reasoned: "if
31. A few months before President Carter announced the termination of the Mutual
Defense Treaty, Congress passed and President Carter signed into law the International
Security Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-384, 92 Stat. 746. Section 26 of that Act (the
Dole-Stone Amendment) provided:
(a) The Congress finds that
(1) the continued security and stability of East Asia is a matter of major
strategic interest to the United States;
(2) the United States and the Republic of China have for a period of
twenty-four years been linked together by the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954;
(3) the Republic of China has during that twenty-four year period faithfully and continually carried out itsduties and obligations under that treaty;,
and
(4) it is the responsibility of the Senate to give itsadvice and consent to
treaties entered into by the United States.
(b) It is the sense of the Congress that there should be prior consultation between the Congress and the executive branch on any proposed changes affecting the continuation in force of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. (22 U.S.C.
§ 2151 (Supp. 11 1978)).
32. 14 WEEKLY Comp. or PasS. Doc. 2266 (Dec. 15, 1978).
33. Id.
34. No. 78-2412 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 1979), reprinted in 125 CONG. REC. S14787-93 (daily
ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
35. No. 78-2412 (D.D.C. June 6, 1979).
36. Only one of the resolutions, S. Res. 15, introduced by Sen. Harry Byrd, Jr., reached
the floor of the Senate. See also S. Res. 10, 125 CONG. REc. S209 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1979)
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the Congress approves the President's action, the issue . . .would be
moot. If the Senate or the Congress takes action, the result of which falls
short of approving the President's termination effort, then the controversy will be ripe for a judicial declaration . ..."
Literally within hours of the District Court's June 6, 1979 order, the
Senate voted fifty-nine to thirty-five in favor of substituting Senator
Harry Byrd, Jr.'s amendment into Senate Resolution 15. The amended
resolution provided: "[t]hat it is the sense of the Senate that approval of
the United States Senate is required to terminate any mutual defense
treaty between the United States and another nation. 3 7 No final vote
was ever taken on the resolution and it was returned, as amended, to the
Senate calendar."
Although the Senate action was admittedly not a decisive or formal
one, the amended resolution was characterized by the court in its October
17, 1979, opinion as "the last expression of Senate position on its consti-

(introduced by Sen. Dole); S. Con. Res. 22, id. at S219 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1979) (introduced
by Sen. Goldwater).
37. 125 CONG. REc. S7015, S7038-39 (daily ed. June 6, 1979). S. Res. 15, as reported by
the Foreign Relations Committee, would have recognized 14 different situations in which
the President could unilaterally act to abrogate United States treaty obligations:
(1) in conformity with the provisions of the treaty;
(2) by consent of all the parties after consultation with the other contracting
states;
(3) where it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of
denunciation or withdrawal;
(4) where a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature
of the treaty; .
(5) where it appears from a later treaty concluded with the same party and
relating to the same subject matter that the matter should be governed by that
treaty;
(6) where the provisions of the later treaty are so far incompatible with those
of the earlier one that the two treaties are not capable of being applied at the
same time;
(7) where there has been a material breach by another party;
(8) where the treaty has become impossible to perform;
(9) where there has been a fundamental change of circumstances;
(10) where there has been a severance of diplomatic or consular relations and
such relations are indispensable for the application of the treaty;
(11) where a new peremptory norm of international law emerges which is in
conflict with the treaty;
(12) where an error was made regarding a fact or situation which was assumed
by that state to exist at the time when the treaty was concluded and formed an
essential basis of its consent to be bound;
(13) where a state has been induced to conclude a treaty by the fraudulent
conduct of another state; and
(14) where a state's consent to be bound has been procured by the corruption
or coercion of its representatives or by the threat or use of force.
S. REP. No. 119, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1979).
38. After oral argument in the Court of Appeals, the Senate debated the resolution, but
again took no formal action. 125 CONG. REc. S16683-92 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 1979).
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tutional role in the treaty termination process." 39 In rejecting the Foreign
Relations Committee's proposal, which would have expressly approved of
the President's unilateral action,' 0 the court held that the Senate had sufficiently demonstrated its belief that at least some congressional participation was required in treaty terminations. 41 As the possibility of the congressional acquiescence that would have mooted the issue was deemed to
be no longer likely, the informal action was determined to have met the
standing requirement set forth in the court's Memorandum-Order of June
6, 1979.42 The District Court concluded that the Senate action fell far
short of congressional approval of or acquiescence in the executive's action and that the plaintiffs had therefore clearly suffered "injury in fact
to their legislative right to be consulted and to vote on the termination of
the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty."'
The District Court also ruled that the situation did not present a
nonjusticiable political question as the court was neither endeavoring to
determine the wisdom of the underlying political considerations nor attempting to substitute its judgment for that of a political department, but
rather was merely determining whether the President's unilateral action
to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty was permissible under the
Constitution."
In reaching the merits of the case, the District Court identified the
issue as whether the President was a "party" for the purposes of Article
X and thus able to take unilateral action in providing the notice of termination required under the provision."
The defendants set forth two basic arguments in support of their position that the President possessed such authority. Their first contention
was premised on the executive power over foreign affairs. This power is
derived from the enumerated Article II powers and cloaks the President
with such authority as to make the executive the "sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations."" The defendants
contended that the termination of treaties was similar to the removal of
executive officers as both require senatorial consent as a precondition to
appointment or ratification. As the Supreme Court has held that the
President may unilaterally remove executive officers, 7 the defendants argued that a similar power exists with respect to the termination of
treaties."'

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

125 CONG. REC. S14788 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
See note 37 supra.
125 CONG. Rac. S14788 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
Id.
Id.
Id. at S14788-89.
Id. at S14789.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926).
125 CONG. Rc. S14789 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
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District Court Judge Oliver Gasch disagreed, holding that the two
were not comparable as the removal power is merely concerned with the
President's administrative control over his subordinates."' Unilateral termination of a treaty, on the other hand, conflicts with the "substantial
role of Congress in foreign affairs."6 0 The court concluded by reasoning
that the President is not the sole maker of foreign policy and, moreover,
"the conduct of foreign relations is not a plenary executive power." 81
The defendants' second argument was based on the fact that as the
termination of the Treaty was a condition to the normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC, the President's action was
authorized by his exclusive "[plower to remove.

. .

obstacles to.

.

.rec-

ognition," a power that had been expressly upheld by the Supreme
Court. 2
The court reasoned that an unconstitutional action does not become
permissible merely because it is ancillary to an act of recognition." Such
a limited power of recognition could not be used to "bootstrap" an otherwise unconstitutional action into the realm of legitimacy."
The court noted the inherent inconsistencies which would arise if the
President were deemed to possess unilateral power to terminate treaties."
Reference was made to the Supremacy Clause" which provides that "all
Treaties.

.

.shall be the supreme Law of the Land.

.

." and to the fact

that it would be contradictory that "a constitutional policy requiring joint
action for external agreement and internal legislation could allow that
agreement and law to be terminated by the president alone, against the
intentions of the legislature.' 7 It is undisputed that the President must
obtain senatorial consent before the terms of a treaty can be amended."
The court pointed out that it is even more inconsistent for the President
to ignore the Senate before he completely annuls those same terms.'9
49. Id.

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 125 CONG. REc.S14789 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979). See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203, 229 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1934).

53. 125 CONG. REc. S14790 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
54. Id. Contra Justice Brennan's statement filed in the United States Supreme Court's
decision at 100 S. Ct. 533, 539 (1979) (Mem.): "Abrogation of the defense treaty with Taiwan was a necessary incident to Executive recognition of the Peking government ..
55. 125 CONG. REc. S14790 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
56. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 provides:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in

Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
57. 125 CONG. R.c. S14790 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979). See Reisman & McDougal, Who
Can Terminate Mutual Defense Treaties, NAT'L L.J., May 21, 1979, at 19.
58. The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 75 (1921).
59. 125 CONG. REc. S14790 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
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The District Court concluded therefore that treaty termination, like
treaty formation, is a shared power, which can only be exercised by the
President upon the consent of two-thirds of the Senate (as a treaty is
formed) or upon approval by a majority of both Houses of Congress (as
other "laws" are rescinded)." Therefore the court determined that the
"party" to which the termination provision referred was the United
States, not the President, and that such termination can only be accomplished by an adherence to United States constitutional procedures which
require a form of legislative concurrence.61
B.

2
The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the District Court's decision, but in so doing, it strictly limited its finding that
the President possessed the requisite authority to terminate the Treaty,
based on the particular facts of the present case." Although the decision
of the Court of Appeals was subsequently vacated by the United States
Supreme Court," an analysis of its decision is helpful in determining
what effect Goldwater v. Carter could have on current and future treaties.
The Court of Appeals found that the plaintiffs had sufficient standing to bring the suit if, for purposes of the standing issue, their constitutional theories were accepted as valid." The court held that, as a result of
the executive's unilateral denial of their alleged right to prevent the termination of the Treaty, the plaintiffs had suffered the requisite injury in
fact." The court stressed that no single element was decisive in its determination, but rather its decision was based upon the consideration of a
7
number of factors .

The constitutional interpretation set forth by the District Court"
which differentiated the executive's power to remove appointed officers
from his power to terminate treaties was refuted by the Court of Appeals."9 The latter court reasoned that if the Constitution required senatorial consent to terminate treaties, it would also require such consent
before an executive could remove appointed officers, 70 which the Supreme
Court had long held not to be required.71 The court concluded by noting
60. Id.
61. Id.

62. Goldwater v. Carter, No. 79-2246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
63. Id. at 25.
64. 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979) (Mem.).
65. No. 79-2246 at 9 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
501 (1975).
66. No. 79-2246 at 9-10 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979); see also Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d
190, 211-12 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435-36 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
67. No. 79-2246 at 13-14 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
68. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
69. No. 79-2246 at 14-15 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
70. Id.
71. Compare Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) with In re Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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that merely because the Constitution required senatorial consent for
treaty formation, it did not necessarily imply that such is required for
treaty termination."' The court recognized that "it is not abstract logic or
sterile symmetry that controls [the expansion of the clause], but a sensible and realistic ascertainment of the meaning of the Constitution in the
context of the specific action taken."7 '
The Court of Appeals also dismissed the District Court's finding of
an alternative source of termination authority in an approval by a majority of both Houses of Congress. The District Court had reasoned that as
the Supremacy Clause7 1 included treaties as part of the "supreme Law of
the Land," they could be terminated in the same way other legislation
was repealed, that is, by a majority of both Houses of Congress." The
Court of Appeals interpreted the Supremacy Clause to provide that each
of the specified supreme laws acted to preempt conflicting state law.' e
This preemptive status did not provide any reason to determine that a
treaty must be terminated in the same manner by which it was made or
7
in the manner by which a statute is made or repealed. 7
In addition, the Court of Appeals characterized the Article II, Section
2 treaty-making provision as "a special and extraordinary condition of the
. . . [executive] powers under Article II. '" Such a limitation on the
otherwise relatively undefined executive powers was not to be extended
by implication unless such implication was "unmistakably clear. '" s The
court found the District Court's blanket extension of the constitutional
provision to cover all treaties to be unwarranted and held that such a
limited condition could not be so extended. 0
Moreover, the court noted that while the Article I powers of the legislature are detailed and specific, the Article II powers of the executive
are not so defined or limited. 1 The foreign affairs power is vested in the
President s ' and no limitations upon that power appear in Article II, Section 1. Therefore, the court warned that to read such a limitation into the
Constitution, where none exists either expressly or impliedly, would "inalterably affect the balance of power between the two Branches laid down

72. No. 79-2246 at 14-15 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
73. Id. at 15.
74. Note 56 supra.
75. 125 CONG. Rac. S14790 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
76. No. 79-2246 at 16 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
77. Id. The court's reasoning at this point is supported by the fact that the U.S. Constitution, also designated in Art. VI, cl. 2 as a supreme law of the land, cannot be repealed in
such a manner.
78. No. 79-2246 at 17 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
79. Id.

80. Id.
81. Id. Compare art. I, § 1: All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress.. . ." (emphasis added) with art. H, § 1: "The executive Power shall be vested in
a President.. .. "
82. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
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in Articles I and II."83
The court, in distinguishing a treaty from domestic law, noted that in
the former instance, the Constitution conferred the major role upon the
President, while in the latter instance, it was primarily the domain of the
Congress." The court reasoned that, as a practical matter, Congress could
decline to implement a non-self-executing treaty or preempt a treaty's
effect on domestic law by subsequent legislation.85 It did not follow,
though, that the existence of such power can imply the power to prevent
the termination of a treaty when the President deems it desirable to do so
in the national interest and pursuant to a clause in the treaty itself."
In a logical extension of the plaintiffs' argument, the court recognized
that if a treaty could only be terminated by the identical process by
which it was made, a one-third plus one Senate minority would have the
power to block such a termination."' International law permits the termination of treaties upon a change in circumstances that frustrates the purpose of the treaty" or upon a breach by the other party.8 ' Many of these
treaties involve costly and dangerous obligations. The court recognized
the need for the President to be able to react immediately in many of
these situations, and that to give a Senate minority the power to block
such action would severely curtail the foreign policy powers of the
President."
The Court of Appeals noted that the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus
and the ability to terminate upon a breach by the other party enabled the
President to effectively terminate a treaty in such instances.' 1 The court
held this to be included within the foreign affairs power of the President
and disputed the District Court's suggestion that the President is limited
to being merely a channel of communication."
The court declined to approve the strict constitutional interpretation
advocated by the plaintiffs and set forth by the District Court as it recognized that circumstances had certainly differed in the past and were sure
to do so in the future."3 Such a strict interpretation was held unnecessary
in the instant case and therefore would not be applied." Nor would the
83. No. 79-2246 at 19 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 19-20. See, e.g., Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, 30 Stat. 151, ch. 11, § 3 (Commercial Convention of 1850 with Switzerland); see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194
(1888) ("a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of
legislation" and may be superseded just as a statute).
86. No. 79-2246 at 19-20 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
87. Id. at 20.
88. See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
89. See Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
90. No. 79-2246 at 21 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
91. Id. at 24.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 25.
94. Id.
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court limit such an interpretation to certain important treaties as no judicially manageable basis existed for such a determination."5 The court emphasized that its decision not to require either a two-thirds senatorial
consent or a majority vote in both Houses was solely limited to the present circumstances."
The unique circumstances were of particular importance in the decision of the Court of Appeals. Both the PRC and the ROC asserted that
each of them was the sole legitimate government of China. Prior to December 15, 1978, the United States Government recognized and did not
challenge this fact," but had officially recognized the ROC as the legal
government of China. On December 15, 1978, President Carter announced that, effective January 1, 1979, the United States would withdraw recognition from the ROC and thereafter recognize the PRC as "the
sole legal government of China."'
The court recognized that the Constitution" as well as Supreme
Court decisions 1"0 had granted the President the power to recognize and
derecognize foreign governments. While not deciding that such power enabled the President to remove any and all conditions set forth by the
state being recognized, the court deemed it an "important ingredient"
that the President decided that the circumstances had changed so as to
preclude the continuation of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC. 01
Finally, the fact that the Treaty contained a termination clause was
"of central significance" to the court and "an overarching factor in this
case, which in effect enables all of the other considerations to be knit
together." 1 1 The Senate had consented to a termination provision which
contained no conditions as to who was to act to give the termination notice.1 0 3 As no specific role was reserved in either the Treaty or the Constitution for the Senate or the Congress as a whole, the court ruled that the
President could act unilaterally to terminate the Treaty according to the
termination provision of Article X.104
Concluding, the court cautioned the executive branch against ignor-

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.; see The Shanghai Communique, 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 435 (1972): "The United
States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is
but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not
challenge that position."

98. Note 4 supra.
99. Art. II, § 3 provides: "[H]e shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers
100.
U.S. 324
101.
102.
103.
104.

United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
(1934).
No. 79-2246 at 27-28 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
Id. at 28.
6 U.S.T. 433, 437.
No. 79-2246 at 29 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
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ing the legislature in the termination of treaties.1 0 5 The legislature possessed a great deal of inherent power with which it could demonstrate its
displeasure with the executive. This power included control over fiscal
policy, 106 discretion to implement non-self-executing treaties,1 0 7 discretion
to confirm executive appointments,108 and the ultimate power of impeachment.10 9 The court found, however, that in the present case, the President
did not exceed his authority in terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty of
1954 with the ROC pursuant to Article X, without legislative consent.1110
Chief Judge Wright, with whom Judge Tamm joined, concurred in a
separate opinion but would have denied the plaintiffs standing to sue and
would not have reached the merits of the case."' They did not find a
sufficient legal injury as no formal congressional action had ever been
taken which expressly disapproved of the action taken by the President
112
in terminating the Treaty.
Judge MacKinnon, also in a separate opinion, concurred in the majority's finding that the plaintiffs had standing and that the question
presented was a justiciable one. He dissented, however, with the majority's decision on the merits of the case.1 13 Judge MacKinnon argued that
as the termination of treaties was not one of the enumerated powers of
the Constitution, it was an implied power vested in the government. "
Therefore, Congress was empowered under the Necessary and Proper
Clause'1 to pass legislation directing the President to terminate treaties.116 Moreover, Judge MacKinnon agreed with the District Court's interpretation of the Supremacy Clause to imply that since a treaty was
designated to be a "Law of the Land," it must be terminated in the same
manner as any other "law," that is, by a formal act of Congress approved
by the President. Although Judge MacKinnon generally agreed with the
District Court's reasoning, he would have limited the termination procedure to joint congressional action and would not have granted a termination as did the District Court. 171 Therefore, despite Judge MacKinnon's
dissent, his opinion would also have required a reversal of the District
Court's decision.

105. Id. at 30.
106. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.

107. Id.
108. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
109. Id. art. I §§ 2, 3; art. II, § 4.
110. No. 79-2246 at 30 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
111. Id., Concurring Opinion at 1.
112.- Id. at 6.
113. Id., Dissenting Opinion at 1.
114. Id. at 2.
115. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 provides that the Congress shall have power "To make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing [enumerated] Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or officer thereof."
116. Dissenting Opinion at 2, No. 79-2246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).

117. Id.
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C.

The Supreme Court Decision"O
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court granted
the petition for certiorari, and then vacated the judgment of the Court of
Appeals. The case was remanded to the District Court which was directed
to dismiss the complaint. No majority opinion accompanied the Memorandum Decision, but all of the Justices, save Justice Marshall who concurred only in the result, either filed statements or joined those which
were filed.
Justice Powell, although concurring in the judgment, would have dismissed the complaint as not ripe for judicial review.119 Justice Powell
found that as no formal confrontation had occurred between the executive and legislative branches of government, it could not be definitively
said that Congress disapproved of the President's action.120 In the absence of such a formal disapproval and resulting stand-off, the case was
not ripe for judicial review.
Justice Rehnquist filed a statement in which Chief Justice Burger,
Justice Stewart, and Justice Stevens joined. Justice Rehnquist concurred
in the judgment but would have dismissed the complaint as a nonjusticiable political question.1 2 1 He recognized the historic interchange between
Congress and the President with regard to the termination of treaties and
made note that each branch possessed adequate resources with which to
safeguard its interests and to assert its powers. 32 Therefore, in light of
the fact that different procedures had historically been used in terminating various treaties, Justice Rehnquist argued that this particular case
was controlled by the political standards that had controlled like cases in
the past and that the Court should refrain from setting forth concrete
judicial standards pertaining to the termination of treaties. 1 8
Justice Blackmun filed an opinion, which Justice White joined, dissenting to the dismissal of the case. Justices Blackmun and White would
have given the case plenary consideration for a decision on the merits
regarding the issue of whether the President possesses the power to unilaterally terminate a treaty as he so alleged. 1 " As Justice Blackmun
noted, "if the President does not have the power to terminate the treaty
118. Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979) (Mem.).

119. Id.
120. Id. at 534.
121. Id. at 536.
122. Id. at 538. Judge Wright observed in his concurring opinion:
Congress has a variety of powerful tools for influencing foreign policy decisions
that bear on treaty matters. Under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, it
can regulate commerce with foreign nations, raise and support armies, and de-

clare war. He has power over the appointment of ambassadors and the funding
of embassies and consulates. Congress thus retains a strong influence over the
President's conduct in treaty matters.
Concurring Opinion at 13, No. 79-2246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
123. 100 S. CL at 537.
124. Id. at 539.
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• . .the notice of intention to terminate surely has no legal effect."'' 2
Justice Brennan also filed a statement in which he dissented from
the dismissal order. Justice Brennan would have affirmed the judgment of
the Court of Appeals to the extent that its decision rested upon the right
of the executive to recognize and to derecognize foreign governments. ' 6
Justice Brennan would have resolved the constitutional question on the
narrow ground that the termination was a "necessary incident" to the
7
recognition process of the PRC."
IV. THE EFFECT OF GOLDWATER

V. CARTER ON OTHER CURRENT

TREATIES

The plaintiffs, the District Court, and Judge MacKinnon of the
Court of Appeals all warned that a number of current treaties contained a
termination provision similar to that found in the Mutual Defense
Treaty.1 8 They suggested that if the President prevailed in this situation,
a number of major treaties essential to the national security would be
continually vulnerable to the unchecked judgment of a single individual.
The United States Supreme Court sought to allay those concerns in
the statements filed with its decision. In the plurality statement filed by
Justice Rehnquist, the Court's decision was analogized to the method of
disposition followed in disposing of cases which became moot prior to resolution by the Supreme Court.' 1' In disposing of such cases, the Supreme
Court had instructed lower courts to dismiss the complaints in order to
"prevent a [lower court] judgment, unreviewable because of mootness,
from spawning any legal consequences."'' 0

125. Id.
126. Id. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
127. 100 S. Ct. at 539.
128. See, e.g., The North Atlantic Treaty, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No.
2846, 199 U.N.T.S. 67, art. XIX: "1. The present Agreement may be denounced by any
Contracting Party after the expiration of a period of four years from the date on which the
Agreement comes into force."
The Nuclear Weapons Test Ban Treaty, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433,
480 U.N.T.S. 43, art. IV provides:
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the
subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its
country. It shall give notice of such withdrawals to all other Parties to the
Treaty three months in advance.
The Outer Space Treaty, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S.
205, art. XVI states: "Any State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from
the Treaty one year after its entry into force by written notification to the Depository Governments. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from the date of receipt of this
notification."
See also the Biological Weapons Convention, April 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No.
8062, art. XIII; and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161, art. X.
129. 100 S. Ct. at 538.
130. Id. See United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 40-41 (1950) where the Supreme Court described the procedure as one which "clears the path for future relitigation of
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The plurality noted that invoking this procedure with regard to political questions, which should never have been decided on their merits, was
even more imperative in order to keep such lower court decisions from
"spawning any legal consequences." '' Therefore, the plurality sought to
make it clear that although President Carter would not be precluded, in
this instance, from unilaterally terminating the Treaty, the lower court
decisions were not to have any precedential effect whatsoever.8 3
Notwithstanding the vacating of the prior judgment, the fact remains
that President Carter was not precluded from unilaterally terminating
the Treaty. This result raises the question of the circumstances under
which other treaties of the United States might be similarly terminated
83
by the unilateral actions of the executive.
Although the Supreme Court did not file a majority opinion with its
decision, the reasoning of the individual Justices who filed statements
with the memorandum decision as well as the majority opinion of the
Court of Appeals is helpful in determining the necessary ingredients for a
determination on the merits of the legality of any future executive attempts at treaty termination.
The common thread running through all of the somewhat discordant
decisions and opinions regarding the case (save perhaps that of the District Court) was the recognition of the unique circumstances involved.
One such circumstance was the relatively restrained reaction of Congress.
That reaction was manifested largely by the substitution on Senator
Byrd's amendment in Resolution 15. While seemingly sufficient as "the
last expression of Senate position on its constitutional role in the treaty
termination process"''
to provide the plaintiffs with a small foothold
with which to obtain the requisite standing, this reaction ultimately
proved to be the Achilles' heel of the plaintiffs' argument. A formal resolution passed by both Houses of Congress which opposed the executive's
action and which had asserted its constitutional role in the treaty termination process would have provided the concrete constitutional impasse
required before the Supreme Court could, or even should, decide the issue
3 5
based upon a constitutional interpretation.
Justices White, Blackmun, and Brennan disagreed with the majority's order that the case be dismissed, thereby recognizing that a sufficient

the issues between the parties and eliminates a judgment, review of which was prevented
through happenstance. When that procedure is followed, the rights of all parties are preserved; none is prejudiced by a decision which . . .was only preliminary."
131. 100 S. Ct. at 538.
132. Id.
133. Compare the ensuing analysis with S. Res. 15, note 37 supra.
134. 125 CONG. REc. S14788 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1979).
135. "If the Congress, by appropriate formal action, had challenged the President's authority to terminate the treaty with Tawan, the resulting uncertainty could have serious
consequences for our country. In that situation, it would be the duty of this Court to resolve
the issue." 100 S. Ct. 533, 536 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
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stand-off between the parties had occurred as a result of the amended
resolution. Justice Powell, however, made clear in his statement that the
lack of a formal confrontation between the two branches of government
was the sole reason for his decision to dismiss." 6 Although Justice Powell
charged Justice Rehnquist with suggesting that "the issue presented by
this case is a nonjusticiable political question which can never be considered by this Court,"""' a close examination of the plurality statement filed
by Justice Rehnquist reveals that it too was confined to this particular
case and hinted that a formal confrontation between the executive and
legislative branches of government might affect subsequent decisions.'"
The plurality statement begins by perceiving that "the basic question
presented by the petitioners in this case is 'political' and therefore nonjusticiable.

. ...

"s,

After analogizing the present case with the Supreme

Court opinion in Coleman v. Miller,"0 Justice Rehnquist continued to
emphasize that "the controversy in the instant case is a nonjusticiable
political dispute that should be left for resolution by the Executive and
Legislative Branches of the Government."'4 Pointing to the fact that no
judicial standards existed which pertain to treaty termination and that
such matters have historically been accomplished by a variety of political
methods, the plurality continued to confine its decision to the present
case, concluding that "the instant case . . . also 'must surely be con-

trolled by political standards.' "14 Recognizing that no constitutional impasse had been reached and that the matter was still in the realm of political resolution rather than deadlocked in an impasse requiring a
judicial settlement, the plurality noted that, should they so desire, each
such coequal branch of government "has resources available to protect
and assert its interests

..

."

and again concluded that "the question

presented in this action is nonjusticiable .... .
The repeated reference by the plurality to the instant case and the
limitation of the decision to the issues presented by it was both pointed
and conspicuous. Justice Powell's claim that the plurality suggested that
this issue is one which could never be decided by the Supreme Court appears to be unfounded as the plurality had every opportunity to do just
that but consistently drew the line just short. Moreover, the declaration
that each branch possessed the means to protect its own interests appeared to be an invitation to Congress to take such measures in the future and, in such a manner, remove the issue from the political realm in
which it had historically dwelt.
136. "If the Congress chooses not to confront the President, it is not our task to do so. I
therefore concur in the dismissal of this case." Id. at 534.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 538.
139. Id. at 536 (emphasis added).
140. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
141. 100 S. Ct. 533, 537 (1979) (emphasis added).
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
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The Court of Appeals listed a number of considerations that entered
into its determination that the President possessed the requisite authority in the present circumstances to terminate the Mutual Defense
Treaty. " Two of the considerations were peculiar to the unique circumstances of the present suit and, as such, their absence in future situations
could provide a basis for distinguishing those instances from the present
case.
Perhaps the most unique aspect of this case was the fact that the
termination occurred simultaneously with the derecognition of the government of the ROC and the recognition of that of the PRC. Although
the Court of Appeals was careful to note that the recognition power did
not authorize the President to take any action that was required or requested by the government being recognized, it regarded as an "important ingredient" the fact that the President had determined that the conditions surrounding the Treaty had so changed as to preclude its
continuance.' 5 Similarly, Justice Brennan stated in his dissent to the
Supreme Court's decision to dismiss that he would have affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals only to the extent that it relied upon
the President's authority to recognize and derecognize foreign governments. 4"
This emphasis on the fact that the termination occurred as the government of the ROC was being derecognized in favor of the government
of the PRC was a significant consideration and one which is unique in the
historical context of treaty terminations.' The particular circumstances
of the present situation form an obvious basis on which to distinguish
future executive attempts to terminate treaties.
Another significant consideration which was peculiar to the Goldwater situation was the termination provision of the treaty itself.",8 The
Court of Appeals emphasized that as the termination clause was silent as
to any required procedures, the authority to enact the clause rested in the
President as the nation's foreign affairs representative."' It would appear, therefore, that if a treaty or subsequent legislation provided that
the Congress should play a role in the termination of the treaty, the President would be obligated to seek such participation prior to an effective
50
treaty termination.

144. No. 79-2246 at 13 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
145. Id. at 27-28; see note 19 supra.
146. 100 S.Ct. at 539, citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410
(1964) and United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228-30 (1942). No indication was made,
however, as to the extent of this executive power in the absence of circumstances involving
the recognition or derecognition of sovereign states.
147. See note 21 supra.
148. 6 U.S.T. at 437. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
149. No. 79-2246 at 29 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
150. Id. at 28, 29. An analogous situation currently exists in an area of foreign affairs
formerly the exclusive domain of the executive. The War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1541 et seq. (1976), requires the President inter alia to "consult with Congress before
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Therefore, although dire consequences had been predicted if the
President were to be allowed to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty,
none would apear to be forthcoming. Notwithstanding the decision of the
Supreme Court to vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals, the reasoning of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals incorporated
the unique circumstances of the present situation so as to make future
attempts at termination readily distinguishable. Moreover, a formal disapproval of the executive's action by Congress is necessary in order to
crystallize a constitutional impasse which could be resolved by a judicial
determination on the merits.
V.

GOLDWATER V. CARTER AND THE INCREASING CONGRESSIONAL ROLE IN

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

As the modern world has become more complex and interdependent,
Congress has necessarily begun assuming a larger role in the foreign affairs of the United States. It has not done so ultra vires but has substantial constitutional authority for influencing executive foreign policy decisions as well as its own involvement in the realm of foreign affairs." 1
Such influence appears to be increasing as Congress seeks to assert some
of its heretofore primarily dormant powers. One question raised by Goldwater v. Carter is whether the Senate can condition its approval of a
treaty upon the inclusion of a provision which requires some form of congressional assent before a treaty can be terminated. The decision of the
Court of Appeals and the plurality statement of the Supreme Court,
while not expressly stating that the Senate has the power to reserve to
itself in treaties at the time of their submission a specific role in their
termination, seem to imply that such may not be expressly barred. 52
Therefore, Congress might consider enacting legislation (or in the alternative, the Senate might contemplate a Senate Resolution) providing
53
for a specific termination clause to be included in all future treaties.
introducing United States Armed forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated . . . ." The Dole-Stone Amendment to the
International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-384, 92 Stat. 746, § 26 (see
note 31 supra) can be distinguished from such legislation since that amendment neither
specifically referred to the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty nor required congressional assent for such termination. Should Congress seek to assure itself of a role in future
treaty terminations, such specificity would appear to be required.
151. See note 122 supra.
152. See 100 S. Ct. at 538; No. 79-2246 at 30, 31 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
153. This type of resolution, analogous to the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§
1541 et seq. (1976), (see note 150 supra), is considered "framework legislation" and provides
statutory guidelines for constitutional functions of the entire governmental process based on
a congressional interpretation of the Constitution. Signed and approved by the executive
branch of government, such legislation provides specific answers to questions regarding con-

stitutionally vague powers based on a common understanding and mutual agreement of the
executive and congressional branches of government. Professor Gerald Gunther describes it
as "an unusual, quasi-constitutional variety of congressional action, delineating not substantive policy but processes and relationships." G. GuNTHER, CAsms AND MATERIALS ON CONSnTUTIONAL LAW 429 (9th ed. 1975). The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act
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This termination clause could be drafted along the lines of those currently in use which provide for the termination of a treaty by either party
after a specified grace period in accordance with the terminating state's
"constitutional processes." The phrase "constitutional processes" could
be defined in the statute or resolution to require the approval of both the
President and two-thirds of the Senate.
Although the effects of such legislation would be many, it should not,
by any means, be considered a panacea for the issue raised in Goldwater
v. Carter.'" The President, as the "sole organ of the federal government
in the field of international relations,"15 5 retains the exclusive power to
negotiate international treaties and could not constitutionally be required
to include such a termination clause. The Senate, whose approval is required before a treaty can be ratified by the President, has the power,
however, to effectively require such a clause by either of two methods: (1)
in approving the treaty, attach an "understanding," reserving to the Senate a role in its termination, such "understanding" to be accepted by the
executive upon the Senate's ratification of the treaty; or (2) withhold its
approval of a treaty which fails to include such a provision or make its
approval contingent upon the subsequent inclusion of such a provision.
Therefore, not only would the Senate be assured of a role in the termination process but foreign states would be relieved of the current uncertainty and confusion surrounding the meaning of the phrase "according
to constitutional processes" as it relates to United States treaty terminations. Finally, such legislation would not "set in concrete a particular constitutionally acceptable arrangement by which the President and Congress are to share treaty termination,

15 6

a result which was sought by at

least as many people as those who opposed it in the Goldwater litigation.
To the contrary, such legislation would retain the multifarious political
means by which treaties have traditionally been terminated. 5 7 Congress
could still unilaterally initiate the termination of treaties by delegating
power or by granting authorization to the President to terminate treaties'1 and could continue to enact legislation having the effect of nullifyof 1974, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1976), is another example of framework legislation.
154. One unfortunate effect of such legislation would be a rise in the number of executive agreements by the President so as to circumvent the requirements of Senate approval
for ratification and termination. Even without the presence of legislation such as that herein
proposed, Congress is becoming particularly concerned about the rising number of executive
agreements. See Congressional Review of International Agreements: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on InternationalSecurity and Scientific Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
155. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
156. Concurring Opinion at 13, No. 79-2246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1979).
157. See generally Resolution Concerning Mutual Defense Treaties: Hearings on S.
Res. 15 Before the Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 (1979).
158. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961)
(Commercial Convention of 1902 with Cuba); J. Res. of Jan. 8, 1865, 13 Stat. 566 (1866)
(Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 with Great Britain); J. Res. of June 17, 1874, 18 Stat. 287 (1875)
(Commercial Convention with Belgium). See also Ropes v. Clinch, 20 F. 1171 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
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ing the domestic effects of a treaty, thereby obligating the executive to
formally terminate the treaty. 1" The framework legislation or resolution
would merely assure the Senate of a role in those treaty terminations initiated by the executive. If there are any insights at all to be gathered
from Goldwater v. Carterregarding the senatorial role in treaty terminations, it can only be that such is not a constitutional right per se, and it
has become readily apparent that in such cases the Supreme Court will
only help those who help themselves.
VI. CONCLUSION
Goldwater v. Carterhas added yet another chapter to the convoluted
history of congressional and executive interaction on the question of termination of international treaties. Although the issues had never before
confronted the judiciary in such a seemingly concrete manner, the Supreme Court declined to resolve the constitutional question presented.
The Court had historically been reluctant to interpret the Constitution
where other legal grounds existed on which to base a decision, and Goldwater was no exception. Whether history will deal kindly with the addition of such an obviously expedient decision to the confusion surrounding
the question of executive treaty termination power is not yet clear. What
is clear, however, is that the confusion remains.

1871).
159. See, e.g., Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, 30 Stat. 151, ch. 11, § 3 (commercial Convention of 1850 with Switzerland); see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)
("[A) treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation" and so may be superseded by such.).

